Luis L Schenoni

Almost four decades have passed since the Argentina-Brazil balance of power gave way to a Brazilian uncontested primacy in the Southern Cone. The peaceful and cooperative nature of this regional power transition poses an interesting puzzle for structural theories and those concerned with the US-China transition. Why do certain countries accept accommodation more leniently, like Argentina did? I offer an explanatory model and use process tracing to show that key cooperative turns in this bilateral relationship—during the late 1970s and early 1990s—required concurrent structural changes, both at the international and domestic levels. My conclusions suggest, against the prevalent narrative, that cooperation between Argentina and Brazil was not a product of democracy. Instead, peaceful power transitions take place when the costs of confrontation are high and social coalitions are largely redefined in the declining state.

We contribute to the extensive literature on international influences on democratization and democratic breakdowns by conceptualizing hegemonic mechanisms of regime change and offering empirical assessments of hegemonic influences. Our findings are based on a multi-methods approach and highlight the varying importance of hegemonic mechanisms in post-1945 Latin America. We argue that US support for democratization was consistent in the wave of transitions to democracy that began in Latin America in 1978 and that it was decisive in many of these transitions. While some past work has attributed responsibility to the US for the waves of democratic breakdowns from 1948 to 1956 and 1964 to 1976, an examination of the 27 breakdowns from 1945 to 2010 gives reason to doubt this interpretation. Future research could use these conceptual and methodological tools to explore the role of other powers in waves of democracy and authoritarianism.

What is the effect of foreign aid on the survival of autocratic regimes? Extant work about the effect of foreign aid on the recipient’s political regime has come to contradictory conclusions. Current findings display the full spectrum of possibilities from a democratizing effect to the enhancement of authoritarian survival. While some studies suggest that foreign aid strengthen autocrats and their incentives to cling to power, others have focused on specific periods and donors, thus finding a democratizing effect of foreign aid. In this article, we argue that the effect of foreign aid on autocratic survival does not operate in a direct way, but it is conditional on the levels of political leverage exerted by democratic donors vis-à-vis the autocratic leaders. This leverage, we find, is defined by the capability of democratic donors to back conditionality with effective political pressure. More specifically, we find that given similar levels of aid, autocratic recipients that are highly dependent on the United States—a quintessential democratic donor with extensive political influence—have a shorter survival rate when compared to those with which the United States has weaker ties and thus lower leverage.

This article explores the possibility of conceiving South America and Southern Africa as subsystemic unipolarities under Brazilian and South African primacy, respectively. It argues that this concept, when applied to these regions, sheds light not only on the long-term strategies behind the Brazilian and South African foreign policies towards their neighbourhood, but also on the behaviour of secondary regional powers and small states. This hypothesis questions the maxim that considerations related to polarity affect great powers only. After examining the Brazilian and South African cases, the author undertakes a comparative analysis of 17 countries in these regions, showing that the behaviour of politically stable countries is as predicted by theories of unipolarity.

En los últimos cincuenta años, la participación de Brasil en el total de capacidades materiales de América del Sur ha aumentado de un tercio a la mitad de las mismas. Semejante cambio en la estructura de poder regional no puede haber pasado desapercibido para los vecinos de Brasil. En este artículo intento resolver el puzle principal de la unipolaridad sudamericana: ¿por qué la mayoría de los países de la región no ha aplicado estrategias consistentes de balancing o bandwagoning frente a Brasil? Basándome en algunas intuiciones del realismo neoclásico, propongo que ciertas variables internas (la inestabilidad de gobierno, la baja institucionalización del sistema de partidos y presidentes delegativos) han desviado la atención de las elites políticas y poderes ejecutivos de los desafíos generados por el crecimiento de Brasil. Un análisis comparativo cualitativo de conjuntos nítidos (csQCA) compara esta hipótesis y otras explicaciones alternativas para el desequilibrio regional.

Quatro décadas se passaram desde que o equilíbrio do poder argentino-brasileiro no Cone Sul deu lugar a uma indiscutível primazia do Brasil. A natureza pacífica e cooperativa dessa transição de poder regional representa um enigma interessante para as teorias estruturalistas atuais que preveem as crescentes tensões entre os Estados Unidos e a China Por que alguns países aceitam seu declínio de uma forma mais branda, como a Argentina fez nesse momento? Neste artigo, ofereço um modelo formal e uso a técnica de rastreamento de processos para demonstrar que a principal reviravolta cooperativa nessa relação ocorreu entre o final da década de 1970 e o início da década de 1990. Minhas conclusões sugerem, ao contrário da narrativa predominante, que a cooperação entre a Argentina e o Brasil não foi produto da democratização. Em contraste, o caso sul-americano sugere que as transições pacíficas de poder ocorrem quando os custos do confronto são altos e as coalizões de política externa são redefinidas no estado em declínio.

Despite the tectonic changes that have taken place in Southern Africa since the demise of apartheid, South Africa is still widely considered a hegemonic regional power by scholars, practitioners and pundits. This article challenges this interpretation, asserting that both Pretoria’s foreign policy and that of its neighbours fit the concept of regional unipolarity with more precision. Since the early 1990s, South Africa has pursued leadership within binding regional institutions and invested resources in order to reinforce the sovereignty of second-tier states such as Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, which have in turn disputed its diplomatic and military primacy, achieving impressive results. This behaviour is characteristic of unipoles rather than hegemons. In this article I revisit the evolution of South African relations with its more proximate neighbours in a transition from hegemony (1961–1990) to unipolarity. I start by defining both concepts and clarifying the behaviours that regional powers and small states are expected to have under hegemonic and unipolar settings. Then, I examine inter-state relations in the region, showing that the concept of unipolarity best describes power distribution and best predicts foreign policy in Southern Africa since the 1990s. Finally, I show that this exercise in concept rectification illuminates comparisons with other regional unipoles, and provides a useful framework to forecast the consequences of an eventual Southern African bipolarity, if Angola continues to catch up.

Within the last fifty years, the Brazilian share of South American power has increased from one-third to one-half of the overall material capabilities in the region. Such a significant change in the regional power structure cannot have gone unnoticed by Brazil’s neighbors. The article addresses the main question related to South American unipolarity (1985–2014): Why have most countries in the region not implemented any consistent balancing or bandwagoning strategies vis-à-vis Brazil? Drawing on neoclassical realism, the article proposes that certain domestic variables – government instability, limited party-system institutionalization, and powerful presidents – have diverted the attention of political elites and foreign policy executives from the challenges generated by a rising Brazil. Crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis is used to test this hypothesis and other, alternative explanations for the regional imbalance.

O estudo da política externa do Brasil tem adquiridouma relevancia notável nos últimos anos. No amplo espectro de temas abordados por essa literatura, este artigo objetiva colocar em diálogo dois debates que, até o momento, têm se desenvolvido por vias separadas. O primeiro deles se refere ao alcance da liderança do Brasil, associada à sua ascensão como potência emergente, o segundo aponta para o surgimento de um número cada vez maior de atores dentro do Estado brasileiro que participam ativamente da formulação e da prática da política externa, ou seja, que se internacionalizaram. Enquanto o primeiro debate pretende um estudo do Brasil na política internacional, o segundo busca compreender as dinâmicas domésticas
de sua política externa. São focos diferentes, mas construir uma ponte entre essas duas perspectivas é um movimento intuitivo que supõe, basicamente, duas perguntas: como a ascensão do Brasil afeta os atores dentro do Estado? E como a atividade desses atores afeta
a capacidade do Brasil de projetar-se globalmente e liderar a região?
Este artigo postula que conhecer a atividade dos atores do Estado envueltos na formulação da política externa é relevante, na medida em que afeta a estabilidade desta, assim como o poder de agenda e de negociação dos paises. Por conseguinte, um Estado mais internacionalizado
estaria mais capacitado a exercer um papel de liderança internacional. Embora o
Brasil possua uma liderança estrutural – dada por suas maiores capacidades materiais – e uma incipiente liderança institucional –dada por novos organismos em que se situa como referência, como na União de Nações Sul-Americanas (UNASUL) –, também tem sabido exercer uma liderança situacional – dada pelo desempenho de suas instituições e de seus agentes domésticos.

This article is framed within the current debate on emerging powers from a Latin American perspective. It tries to solve some of the theoretical problems of the mainstream rationalist approach in IR theory, proposing a model of change rooted in the current realist program. This framework is applied to the study of power politics in South America with the goal of answering two major questions: why has Brazilian foreign policy been so successful in positioning this country as an emerging power? And why have not any country in the region reacted accordingly to the challenge posed by its mayor regional counterpart rise?

"This article intends to describe the behaviour of weak states within a context of hegemonic expansion, assuming that, from the crisis and fall of the Soviet Union to the beginning of the Irak War, this is the situation that best describes American offensive policies toward power vacuum situations in regions such as the Middle East. Therefore, the reaction of a representative sample of states in that region (Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Libya and Pakistan) will be analyzed in accordance with policies designed in Washington, trying to describe the most important variables
of the interaction as well as restraints imposed to sovereignty of these states and the limits to American expansionism in this region. In order to deal with this matter, a discussion on the different responses given by the international relations theories will be intended. After rescuing theoretical thought on weak states from oblivion, we will try to develop an explanation based on a new model of interaction based on realistic premises."

"El presente trabajo pretende analizar, desde una perspectiva
original, el pensamiento de Nicolás Maquiavelo, y en especial
su concepción de la política. En un principio, nos propondremos
discernir qué es la política para este autor, cuáles son
sus presupuestos esenciales y qué características propias tiene
aquello que llama “político”. Posteriormente, intentaremos poner
en discusión, mediante un desarrollo sistemático, la hipótesis de
que las concepciones éticas y antropológicas de este autor se
condicen plenamente con sus ideas sobre la política y el poder, y
son los derivados lógicos de ellas. El desarrollo del trabajo
permitirá realizar un amplio análisis del trasfondo filosófico de la
reflexión maquiavélica y proporcionar una explicación a su noción
del hombre, el poder y la moral."

"En este trabajo se intentará cuestionar la utilidad del
concepto de “Estado” para interpretar determinados fenómenos
de política internacional, considerando la centralidad que tiene
el concepto en las teorías de las Relaciones Internacionales y para
los formuladores de política exterior en general. Se tomará como
caso de estudio el conflicto en Afganistán, argumentando que el
mismo no puede circunscribirse a las categorías de lo estatal, en
tanto involucra realidades sociales muy diferentes a las presentes
en la historia moderna occidental. Después de deconstruir estos
conceptos, se intentará postular algunas opciones estratégicas
que se desprenden de una concepción más amplia del conflicto."

Approximately four decades ago, the Southern Cone witnessed the beginning of a transition from a bipolar balance of power between Argentina and Brazil to unipolarity under Brazilian primacy. While such processes are expected to generate conflict, this particular transition was cooperative, leaving an interesting IR puzzle unresolved: Why did Argentina stop counterbalancing Brazil and opt for accommodation instead? Building on power transition theory, I use process tracing to show that key cooperative turns in this bilateral relationship – during the late 1970s and early 1990s – were possible only after social coalitions were redefined in Argentina. My conclusions suggest that cooperation between Argentina and Brazil was not a product of democracy but rather a consequence of structural changes, at both the international and the domestic level.

Within the last 50 years, the Brazilian share of South American power has increased from one‐third to one‐half of the overall material capabilities in the region. Such a significant change in the regional power structure cannot have gone unnoticed by Brazil’s neighbors.
The article addresses the main question related to South American unipolarity (1985–2014): Why have most countries in the region not implemented any consistent balancing or bandwagoning strategies vis‐à‐vis Brazil? Drawing on neoclassical realism, the article proposes that certain domestic variables – government instability, limited party‐system institutionalization, and powerful presidents – have diverted the attention of political elites and foreign policy executives from the challenges generated by a rising Brazil. Crisp‐set qualitative comparative analysis is used to test this hypothesis and other alternative explanations for the regional imbalance.

In a recent article published in Democratization, we examine how Washington's policies affected transitions from authoritarianism (37) and democratic breakdowns (27) in Latin America from 1945 to 2010. Our research demonstrates five ways in which U.S. policy toward Latin American democracy is changing. The United States no longer supports democracy One of our key findings is that U.S. embassies — together with broader U.S. democratic promotion programs — supported every transition during the third wave of democratization that started in 1978. Furthermore, American foreign aid — a proxy for U.S. support for democracy — is closely associated with democratization during this wave. This is no longer true. As recent reports have discussed, the long-standing policy of democracy promotion has been virtually abandoned by the current administration. Last year, the State

En cuestión de semanas, más de una década de kirchnerismo ha encontrado su fin en Argentina. El cambio ha sido abrupto y atentos a las primeras medidas, muchos intentan vaticinar el rumbo que el gobierno de Mauricio Macri dará a la política exterior. Sin embargo, la situación económica argentina, la atribulada salida de Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (CFK) y las crisis políticas en Brasil y Venezuela, han impuesto un oscuro velo
a los hacedores de pronósticos.
Por estos mismos motivos, en este artículo hablaré de cuatro escenarios posibles. Tres de ellos habrán sido descartados en unos pocos meses y solo alguno (siendo optimista) prevalecerá. Para identificarlos, propongo analizar (a) el perfil ideológico y las propuestas del flamante presidente argentino, (b) las instituciones
que pueden moldear sus decisiones en materia de política exterior, y (c) los cambios de contexto que pueden afectar
sus capacidades y/o sus preferencias. En particular, pondré el foco en dos factores contextuales que parecen ser de especial importancia para definir los rumbos de la política exterior: la suerte de la izquierda latinoamericana (incluido el kirchnerismo en repliegue) y el apoyo que Macri reciba de occidente y los mercados.

Hoje em dia, a maior divisão nas RI dá-se entre racionalistas e reflexivistas, mas ambos os lados se comportam como se o ignorassem e pouco diálogo foi atingido até agora. Mesmo que esse debate seja também epistemológico, ético, e teórico, o objetivo deste artigo é analisar se algum diálogo pode ser alcançado, para começar, no nível conceitual. Por isso, explora dois conceitos que têm sido amplamente trabalhados pelos acadêmicos críticos das RI: os conceitos de exceção e emancipação, tentando traduzi-los para uma linguagem positivista – uma definição operativa ou empírica–, prestando especial atenção aos possíveis ganhos teóricos que podem oferecer para uma interpretação realista da política mundial, mas também para uma crítica – desde dentro – ao discurso realista.

Este artículo propone una crítica del concepto de State Sponsor of Terrorism, término que a partir de la práctica de la política exterior de los Estados Unidos se ha convertido en uno de los principales discursos para legitimar la guerra en el siglo XXI. Esta noción fue esgrimida concretamente tras el 11-S contra Afganistán e Irak y sirvió para compeler a través de la amenaza del uso de la fuerza el accionar de muchos otros Estados en los años posteriores. Bajo el marco analítico de los estudios críticos sobre seguridad y terrorismo, intentaremos mostrar las falacias que evidencia la aplicación de este concepto a un caso histórico concreto –Afganistán en el 2001-, para luego proceder a una crítica del concepto como tal, en base a sus contradicciones internas y contenido normativo.

The U.S. has been an active and successful sponsor of liberal democracy in Latin America since the beginning of the third wave of democratization. However, in the early 21 st Century two international factors kicked in, threatening this positive trend: Washington's decaying interest in the region after 9-11, and higher Latin American leverage due to the boom in commodity prices. These factors allowed certain Latin American presidents to undermine the liberal component of democracy – the protection of individual and minority rights against the state – while enhancing its egalitarian component – the distribution of political power across social groups – and their own personal authority. We scrutinize this story by developing indexes of U.S. linkage and leverage vis-à-vis Latin American countries, and looking for the relation between these indicators and the fate of liberal and egalitarian democracy between 2003 and 2014. Our findings suggest that, while the effects of the commodity boom are mixed, U.S. influence had a consistent positive impact on the liberal component and a consistent negative impact on the egalitarian component of democracy. We end by exploring the mechanisms of U.S influence in a few pathway cases.

Au cours du XXI siècle, le Brésil est passé de l'indifférence à la notoriété, avant de décevoir l’opinion publique régionale et mondiale. Pourtant, les images de la récente publication par The Economist montrant un Christ Rédempteur s’envolant et un autre effondré occultent un point essentiel : L’ascension du Brésil a été constante par rapport à ses voisins d’Amérique du Sud.
Cet article tente de dépasser l’interprétation des cycles d'euphorie et de déception à travers une analyse de trente années d’uni polarité sud-américaine. Pour cela, il situe l’Amérique du Sud dans une transition entre l’historique bipolarité Argentine-Brésilienne et la prédominance régionale actuelle de ce dernier. Par la suite, il relate les éléments quantitatifs et qualitatifs qui distinguent le Brésil de ses voisins et aux voisins entre eux. En finalité, il considère les relations avec ces voisins depuis ces trois dernières décennies et découvre la logique régional par derrière la montée du Brésil.

I explore the possibility of conceiving South America and Southern Africa as regional unipolarities under Brazilian and South African primacy, respectively. I will argue that this concept, when applied to a regional context, sheds light not only on the long term strategies behind Brazilian and South African foreign policies, but also on the behavior of secondary regional powers – more precisely, Angola, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mozambique, Venezuela and Zimbabwe – and other small states in their regions. Apparent inconsistencies, which have led many scholars to discard the existence of regional unipolar subsystems, can easily be explained by the incorporation of concrete domestic variables to the analysis. After examining the Brazilian and South African cases, a comparative analysis of seventeen countries in these regions is conducted showing they behave as predicted under unipolarity.

Recent Brazilian foreign policy and IR analysis has developed on the basis of a single unquestioned hypothesis stating that Brazilian rise in terms of its relative power explains its lower alignment with the United States -and even its so called "soft balancing" behavior-. However, a simple statistical analysis can show that, when contextualized within the broader Latin American, Brazilian behavior is not the exception but the rule.